Many modern machine learning applications involve sensitive correlated data, such private information on users connected together in a social network, and measurements of physical activity of a single user across time. However, the current standard of privacy in machine learning, differential privacy, cannot adequately address privacy issues in this kind of data.
Introduction
Machine-learning is increasingly done on personal data, and consequently, it is extremely important to design methods that can learn while still preserving privacy of individuals in the sensitive datasets. For the past several years, the de facto standard of privacy in machine learning has been differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006) , and there is a growing body of work on differentially private learning algorithms (Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Jain et al., 2012; Kifer et al., 2012; Chaudhuri et al., 2012; Hardt and Roth, 2013; Wang et al., 2015; Duchi et al., 2013; Bassily et al., 2014; Imtiaz and Sarwate, 2015) . The typical setting in these works is that each (independently drawn) training example corresponds to a single individual's private value, and the goal is to learn a supervised or unsupervised model while adding enough noise to hide the evidence of the participation of a single individual in the dataset.
Many machine learning applications however increasingly involve a very different setting -correlated data -privacy issues in which have been largely ignored by this literature. An example is data on the flu status of people connected together in a social network; if a fairly large subset of these people are children attending the same school, then their flu status are highly correlated. Another example is data from measurements of physical activity of a single subject across time; if these measurements are made at small intervals, then they are highly correlated as human activities change slowly over time. Differential privacy is usually insufficient to address privacy challenges in such data. For example, in the flu status case, differential privacy with parameter = 1 would advocate adding noise with standard deviation √ 2 to the number of people who have flu. While this hides the evidence of the flu status of a single independent individual, it will not hide the evidence of flu of a child in the school if the school size is big enough. Similarly, in the physical activity example, a modified form of differential privacy, called entry-privacy, will advocate adding noise with standard deviation 2 √ 2 to the histogram of activities; again, this will not hide evidence of the fact that the individual was sitting at a specific time as the same activity is likely to continue for several measurements. Thus to deal with this kind of correlated data, we need a different notion of privacy.
A generalized version of differential privacy called Pufferfish that captures some of these issues has been recently proposed by (Kifer and Machanavajjhala, 2014) . The main idea is to specify what kind of privacy protection is required through three components. These are S, a set of secrets that represents what may need to be hidden, Q, a set of searXiv:1603.03977v1 [cs. LG] 13 Mar 2016 cret pairs that represents pairs of secrets that the adversary should not be able to distinguish between and finally Θ, a class of distributions that can plausibly model correlation in the data. For example, in the flu status case, secrets would be the flu statuses of each person, and the secret pair set would be the set of all pairs of the form (Alice has flu, Alice does not have flu). The distribution class Θ could be the class of all distributions that induce a certain amount of correlation between the flu statuses of people in the connected components. In the physical activity example, the secrets will be the activity at each time point t, secret pairs will be pairs of the form (Activity a at time t, Activity b at time t), for all activity pairs a and b and all t. Assuming that activities transition in a Markovian fashion, Θ will be the set of all Markov Chains over activities. (Kifer and Machanavajjhala, 2014) has shown that Pufferfish is a generalization of differential privacy, and differential privacy essentially is equivalent to Pufferfish when we want to keep each individual's private value secret and when Θ consists of all product distributions over the individuals' values. To address privacy issues in correlated data, we adopt Pufferfish as our privacy definition.
The main challenge in directly applying Pufferfish to correlated data is the lack of suitable mechanisms. While mechanisms are known for specific Pufferfish frameworks (Kifer and Machanavajjhala, 2014; He et al., 2014) , there is no general mechanism, and moreover, there is no mechanism in existing work that applies to correlated data. Our first contribution in this work is to provide a generic mechanism that applies to any Pufferfish framework and provides privacy. Our mechanism, called the Wasserstein Mechanism, is an analogue of the popular global sensitivity mechanism for differential privacy, and exploits a novel connection between privacy and a certain form of the Wasserstein distance between measures.
The Wasserstein Mechanism, due to its extreme generality, is computationally inefficient, and a natural question to ask is whether we can come up with a more computationally efficient mechanism, at least for some cases of practical interest. To address this issue, we turn our attention to the case when correlation between the variables can be described by a Bayesian network, and the goal is to hide the private value of each variable. We provide a second mechanism, called Markov Quilt Mechanism, that can exploit properties of the Bayesian network to reduce the computational complexity. As a case study, we apply our mechanism to a Markov Chain, which models the physical activity measurement problem, and we show that this mechanism runs in O(n 3 ) time in the size of the chain n.
The Privacy Model

Differential Privacy
We begin with defining differential privacy, which was introduced in (Dwork et al., 2006) , and has now become a gold standard for privacy in machine learning.
Definition 2.1. A (randomized) privacy mechanism M (·) is said to be -differentially private if for any set of outcomes S ⊆ Range(M ), and any datasets D and D that differ in the private value of a single individual, we have:
The parameter is called the privacy budget, and is usually set to be a small constant. Differential privacy ensures that the participation of a single individual in the dataset does not alter the probability of any outcome by much. This, in turn, means that if we have an adversary who has prior information on the data and an individual Alice, then participation of Alice in the data will not change the extra information he gains about Alice from observing the output of a differentially-private algorithm on the data (Kifer and Machanavajjhala, 2011; Dwork et al., 2006) .
Finally, a variant of differential privacy, called entryprivacy, enforces (1) for datasets D and D that differ in a single entry or feature of an individual. This means that a change in the value of a fixed feature of any individual Alice in the dataset (for example, Alice's disease status) does not change the probability of any outcome by more than a factor of e when the values of all other features for Alice remain the same.
Recent work has developed a number of generic mechanisms to enforce differential privacy which apply under different conditions; see (Sarwate and Chaudhuri, 2013; Dwork and Roth, 2013) for surveys. The most popular mechanism is the Global Sensitivity Mechanism.
Definition 2.2. (Global Sensitivity Mechanism) The global sensitivity of a function F is defined as:
where D, D are two data sets that differ by a single individual's private value. Given a dataset D, a function F , and a privacy budget , the global sensitivity mechanism outputs:
where Z ∼ Lap(GS(F )/ ).
Here Lap(α) is a Laplace random variable with mean 0 and scale parameter α. (Dwork et al., 2006) shows that this mechanism is -differentially private.
Differential Privacy for Correlated Data
It was shown by (Kifer and Machanavajjhala, 2011) that differential privacy will erase the evidence of a single individual's private value only when individuals in the data are independent. There is thus a potential for privacy leaks when individuals' private values are correlated.
Let us consider two concrete examples when this happens. First, suppose we have a dataset X = {X 1 , . . . , X n } where X i is an indicator variable for whether person i has flu. Our goal is to release (an approximation to) the number of people in the dataset who have flu, while an adversary would like to determine if Alice in the dataset has flu or not.
As changing one person's flu status changes the number of patients by 1, the Global Sensitivity Mechanism (Dwork et al., 2006) will add noise with standard deviation ≈ 1 to the true output value. If the flu status of the people are independent, then this measure will be sufficient to preserve privacy. However now suppose that a certain number of people in the dataset work together, and Alice is in the connected component. Moreover, flu is highly contagious, and passes on between interacting people with probability 0.5. In this case, the noise added due to differential privacy is not sufficient to hide the evidence of Alice's disease status, and we need more noise.
As a second example, consider a time-series X = {X 1 , X 2 , . . .} where X t denotes a discrete physical activity (e.g, running, sleeping, sitting, etc) of a person at time t. Our goal is to release (an approximate) histogram of activities, while the adversary would like to determine what the person was doing at a specific time t.
Looking at each X t as an entry, then we can use entrydifferential privacy, which would propose adding noise with standard deviation ≈ 1/ to each bin of the histogram. However, time-series data is highly correlated across consecutive time periods. Thus, this amount of noise is not sufficient to hide the evidence of their physical activity status, and we need to add more noise.
The Pufferfish Privacy Framework
To account for correlated data, (Kifer and Machanavajjhala, 2014) introduce a novel generalization of the differential privacy framework called Pufferfish.
A Pufferfish privacy framework has three parameters -a set S of secrets, a set Q ⊆ S × S of secret pairs, and a class of data distributions Θ.
S consists of possible facts about the data that we wish to hide, and secrets could refer to a single individual's private data or part thereof. Q is the set of secret pairs that the privacy algorithm wishes to be indistinguishable. Finally, Θ represents a set of distributions that plausibly generate the data, and the set Θ thus controls the amount of allowable correlation in the data. Each θ ∈ Θ represents a belief an adversary may hold about the data, and our goal is to ensure indistinguishability in the face of these beliefs. How do we model the two examples we described above in Pufferfish? In the flu example, the set of secrets S is everyone's disease status. A plausible set of secret pairs Q is {(s i,0 , s i,1 ) : i = 1, . . . , n} where s i,j means person i has flu status j, j ∈ {0, 1}. If only some people in the data are privacy-sensitive, Q can consist of pairs (s i,0 , s i,1 ) where i ranges over all the privacy-sensitive people. Θ is a set of network models that model spread of the disease in question. For example, Θ could be all models where connections represent social interaction, and flu spreads across connections with probability between [0, 0.5]. Observe that this example could also be modeled using group differential privacy -where we enforce (1) for datasets D and D which differ in the disease status of an entire group of connected individuals; however, Pufferfish allows for a more nuanced model that accounts for the diffusion rate as well as the connected individuals.
In the physical activity example, the set of secrets S is the activity status at all times t. Q is the set of all pairs (s t,a , s t,b ) where a, b lie in the set of activities, and where s t,a means that activity a happened at time t. Finally, Θ would be a set of time series models, such as Markov or semi-Markov models that capture how people switch between activities. Observe that another plausible way to model this example is via pan-privacy (Dwork et al., 2010a) , which models a streaming setting where a new individual arrives at each time period, and the goal is continually release a private statistic with time. However, this setting does not capture this example as pan-privacy still (implicitly) assumes that the arriving individuals are independent of individuals existing in the data. (Kifer and Machanavajjhala, 2014) shows that in general, we cannot expect to have privacy against all possible distributions and still retain utility. As a result it is essential to select Θ wisely; if Θ is too restrictive, then we may not have privacy against legitimate prior knowledge on the part of the adversary, and if Θ is too large, then the resulting privacy mechanisms will have little utility. Definition 2.3. A privacy mechanism M is said to bePufferfish private with Pufferfish parameters (S, Q, Θ) if for datasets X ∼ θ where θ ∈ Θ and for all secret pairs (s i , s j ) ∈ Q, and for all w ∈ Range(M ), we have:
when s i and s j are such that P (s i |θ) = 0, P (s j |θ) = 0.
Observe that unlike (1), the probability in (2) is with re-spect to the randomness in the mechanism and X ∼ θ; to emphasize this, we use the notation X instead of D in the definition; in general, we use D to denote a specific dataset. An alternative interpretation of the definition is for X ∼ θ, θ ∈ Θ, for all (s i , s j ) ∈ Q, and for all w ∈ Range(M ), we have:
In other words, knowledge of the output M (X) does not affect the ratio of likelihood of s i and s j , compared to the initial belief.
( Kifer and Machanavajjhala, 2014) shows that Differential Privacy is a special case of Pufferfish, where S is the set of all facts of the form Person i has value x for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and x in a domain X , Q = S × S, and Θ is the set of all distributions where each individuals private value is distributed independently.
A General Pufferfish Mechanism
Recent work has developed a large number of general privacy mechanisms (Dwork et al., 2006; McSherry and Talwar, 2007; Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Nissim et al., 2007; Dwork and Lei, 2009; Chaudhuri et al., 2014 ) that guarantee differential privacy under different conditions. However, while a number of Pufferfish mechanisms for specific frameworks are known (Kifer and Machanavajjhala, 2014; He et al., 2014) , there is no generic mechanism that applies to any Pufferfish framework. Our first contribution is to provide such a mechanism, analogous to the popular Global Sensitivity Mechanism for differential privacy, that guarantees privacy in any Pufferfish framework.
Specifically, given data represented by random variables X (that may be scalar-valued or vector-valued), a Pufferfish privacy framework (S, Q, Θ), and a function F that maps X into a number, our goal is to design a generic mechanism M that satisfies -Pufferfish privacy in the given framework and approximates F (X).
The Mechanism
Our proposed mechanism is inspired by the global sensitivity mechanism in differential privacy; recall that this mechanism adds noise to the function F proportional to the sensitivity, which is the worst case distance between F (D) and F (D ) where D and D are two datasets that differ in the value of a single individual. In Pufferfish, the quantities analogous to D and D are the measures p(F (X)|s i , θ) and p(F (X)|s j , θ) for a secret pair (s i , s j ), and therefore, the added noise should be proportional to some distance between these two measures. It turns out that the relevant distance is a form of the Wasserstein distance.
Definition 3.1 (p-Wasserstein Distance). Let (X , d) be a Radon space, and µ, ν be two probability measures on X with finite p-th moment. The p-th Wasserstein distance between µ and ν is defined as:
where Γ(µ, ν) is the set of all couplings γ over µ and ν.
Intuitively, each γ ∈ Γ(µ, ν) can be regarded as a way to shift probability mass between µ and ν; the cost of a shift γ is (
1/p , and the cost of the min-cost shift is the Wasserstein distance. In particular, we are interested in the ∞-Wasserstein distance
We specifically consider the case when d(x, y) = |x − y|, and thus
The Wasserstein Mechanism. Given a Pufferfish framework (S, Q, Θ) and a function F , the Wasserstein Mechanism is as follows.
2. For any (s i , s j ) ∈ Q and any θ ∈ Θ such that Pr(s i |θ) = 0 and Pr(s j |θ) = 0, let µ i,θ = Pr(F (X) = ·|s i , θ) be the distribution of F (X) conditioned on s i when X ∼ θ. Similarly, define µ j,θ .
Performance Guarantees
We first establish that the Wasserstein Mechanism satisfies -Pufferfish privacy.
Theorem 3.2 (Privacy of the Wasserstein Mechanism).
The Wasserstein Mechanism satisfies -Pufferfish privacy in the framework (S, Q, Θ).
The proof is presented in Appendix A.1.
Recall that Pufferfish reduces to differential privacy in the special case when (a) X = {X 1 , . . . , X n } with each X i being a single individual's value, (b) Θ is the set of all product distributions over the domains of each X i , and (c) Q = {(X i is in the dataset with value x, X i is not in the dataset) : i ∈ [n], x ∈ X }. It can be shown that in this case, the Wasserstein mechanism also reduces to the familiar global sensitivity mechanism. Thus the Wasserstein mechanism is a generalization of the global sensitivity method for Pufferfish.
Mechanisms for Bayesian Networks
The Wasserstein mechanism we provide in the last section is very general and applies to any Pufferfish framework; however, perhaps because of its extreme generality, it is extremely computationally expensive. Thus a natural question to ask is whether we can come up with Pufferfish mechanisms which are less computationally challenging, and which apply to some cases of practical interest. In this section, we provide such a mechanism, called the Markov Quilt Mechanism, when the dependence among the variables in X is described by a Bayesian network, Θ has some special structure, and the goal is to keep the value of any individual node in the network private.
We illustrate our mechanism on a Markov Chain, and show that it runs in time polynomial in the length of the chain. This is an important case that models our physical activity measurement example in Section 2. We derive privacy mechanisms for this case, and provide simulations that demonstrate the associated privacy-accuracy tradeoffs.
The Setting
This section considers a more restricted but more practical setting than the fully general setting of Section 3. We assume that data X can be written as X = {X 1 , . . . , X n }, where each X i lies in a bounded domain X . Let s i a denote the event that X i takes value a. The set of secrets is S = {s i a : a ∈ X , i ∈ [n]}, and the set of secret pairs is
In other words, we would like to hide the value of each individual variable X i from the adversary.
We assume that there is an underlying known Bayesian network G = (X, E) connecting the variables X that is known to us. Each θ ∈ Θ that describes the distribution of the variables is based on this Bayesian network G, but may have different model parameters. An application of this setting is the physical activity monitoring example in Section 2. See Section 4.3 for more details.
Notations. We use X with a lowercase subscript, for example, X i , to denote a single node in G, and X with an uppercase subscript, for example, X A , to denote a set of nodes in G. For a set of nodes X A we use the notation card(X A ) to denote the number of nodes contained in X A .
In this section, we will consider functions F that are 1-Lipschitz, as in Definition 4.1. Since any Lipschitz function can be scaled to be 1-Lipschitz, this is not a significant restriction.
Definition 4.1 (1-Lipschitz). A function F (X 1 , . . . , X n ) is said to be 1-Lipschitz if for all i, and for all pairs X i and X i , we have
The Markov Quilt Mechanism
The main insight behind the Markov Quilt mechanism is that if nodes X i and X j are "far apart" in the graph G, then, X j is largely independent from X i . Thus, to obscure the effect of X i on F , it is sufficient to add noise that is proportional to the number of nodes that are "local" to X i plus a small correction term that accounts for the effect of the distant nodes. The rest of the section will explain how to calculate this correction term, and how to determine the number of local nodes.
We begin with some definitions. First, we quantify how much changing the value of a variable X i ∈ X can affect a set of variables X R ⊂ X, where X i / ∈ X R . To this end, we define the max-influence of a variable X i on a set of variables X R as follows.
Definition 4.2. The max-influence of a variable X i on a set of variables X R is defined as
Here X is the range of any X j and Θ is the set of allowable distributions. The max-influence is thus the maximum max-divergence (Dwork et al., 2010b) between the distributions X R |X i = a, θ and X R |X i = b, θ where the maximum is taken over any pair (a, b) ∈ X × X and any θ ∈ Θ. If X R and X i are independent, then the max-influence of X i on X R is 0, and a large max-influence means that changing X i can have a large impact on the distribution of X R .
Our goal is to design a mechanism that protects the value of each variable X i while still adding a small amount of noise to F ; to do so, we find large sets of nodes X R such that X i has low max-influence on X R . The naive way to find such sets is brute force search, which takes time exponential in the size of G. We now show how properties of the Bayesian network G can be exploited to perform this search more efficiently.
We next provide a second definition that generalizes the familiar notion of a Markov Blanket. Recall that the Markov Blanket of a node u in a Bayesian network consists of its parents, its children and the other parents of its children, and the rest of the nodes in the network are independent of u conditioned on its Markov Blanket. Its generalization, the Markov Quilt, is defined as follows. 1. Deleting X Q partitions G into parts X N and X R such that (a).
there is no edge in G that connects a node in X R to a node in X N .
2. For all x R ∈ X card(X R ) , all x Q ∈ X card(X Q ) and for all a ∈ X , we have:
In other words, X R is independent of X i conditioned on X Q .
Intuitively, X R is a set of "remote" nodes that are far from X i , and X N is the set of "nearby" nodes; X N and X R are separated by the Markov Quilt X Q . Observe that unlike Markov Blankets, a node can have many Markov Quilts. Figure 1 shows an example.
Suppose our goal is to protect the private value of a node X i . It turns out that if we can find an X Q such that (a). the max-influence of X i on X Q is at most δ and (b). X Q is a Markov Quilt of X i , deleting which splits up X into X N and X R , then, adding Laplace noise of scale parameter card(X N )/( − δ) to F is sufficient to preserve Pufferfish privacy.
This motivates the following mechanism, which we call the Markov Quilt Mechanism. To protect the private value of a specific X i , we search over a set S Q,i of Markov Quilts X Q for X i and pick the one which requires adding the least amount of noise to guarantee privacy. We then iterate this process over all X i and add to F the maximum amount of noise needed to protect any X i ; this ensures that the private values of all nodes are protected. 3. Iterate over all Markov Quilts X Q for X i in S Q,i :
4. (a) Suppose deleting X Q breaks up the underlying Bayesian network into a "nearby" set X N and a "remote" set X R with
First, we note that the algorithm makes an underlying assumption that the max-influence of a node X i on a set of nodes X Q may be computed relatively easily; this assumption holds when Θ has some nice structure; see Section 4.3 for a concrete example. Second, the set S Q,i of Markov Quilts that the mechanism searches over can be restricted in specific ways to ensure computational efficiency; however, a potential cost is statistical efficiency -we may end up adding more noise than necessary to preserve privacy because we may exclude some Markov Quilts with very low scores.
Performance Guarantees. The privacy of the Markov Quilt mechanism follows from Theorem 4.4.
Theorem 4.4 (Privacy of Markov Quilt Mechanism).
Let F be a 1-Lipschitz function, and suppose data is represented by a random variable X = {X 1 , . . . , X n } where X i ∈ X . Suppose we are given a Pufferfish framework (S, Q, Θ) where S = {s 
If each S Q,i is non-empty, then the Markov Quilt Mechanism preserves -Pufferfish privacy in the framework (S, Q, Θ).
The proof is presented in the Appendix A.2.
Case Study: Markov Chain
We now show that the Markov Quilt mechanism can be simplified even further when the Bayesian network underlying X is a Markov Chain, which models the physical activity measurement example.
The Setting. We consider data described by a random vector X = {X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X T } over time t ∈ [T ] where each X t represents a state that lies in a finite discrete set X = [k]. In the physical activity monitoring example, X is a set of activities, and each element in [k] represents a particular activity, such as Walking, Running, Sitting and so on. We would like to hide from an adversary the evidence that X t takes a specific value; using s t a represents the event that X t takes value a, our secret set is S = {s t a : a ∈ X , t ∈ [T ]}, and our set of secret pairs is
The underlying Bayesian network G is a Markov chain X 1 → X 2 → . . . → X T , where for each t, X t+1 is independent of X τ , τ < t, conditioned on X t . Each θ ∈ Θ corresponds to a k × k transition matrix P θ for this Markov chain. For simplicity, we focus on Markov Chains whose transition matrices do not change with time; a similar analysis may also be applied to time-varying Markov Chains with some additional complexity.
Properties. We begin by showing that this graphical model has Markov Quilts with particularly simple structures.
Lemma 4.5. Let a, b and i be positive integers such that i − a ≥ 1 and i + b ≤ T . Then, X Q = {X i−a , X i+b } is a Markov Quilt for X i with X N = {X i−a+1 , . . . , X i+b−1 }, and X R = {X 1 , . . . , X i−a−1 } ∪ {X i+b+1 , . . . , X T }.
Moreover, X Q = {X i+b } is a Markov Quilt for X i with X N = {X 1 , . . . , X i+b−1 } and X R = {X i+b+1 , . . . , X T }. Similarly, X Q = {X i−a } is a Markov Quilt for X i with X N = {X i−a+1 , . . . , X T } and X R = {X 1 , . . . , X i−a−1 }.
We next quantify the max-influence e(X Q |X i ) of a Markov Quilt X Q for X i in terms of properties of Θ. In general, this is a complex task, but it is considerably simplified for the model class we consider. We first define two pieces of notation.
For any θ ∈ Θ, let π θ be the stationary distribution of the Markov Chain whose transition matrix is P θ . We define:
as the probability of the least probable state in the stationary distribution corresponding to any θ ∈ Θ. Additionally, we define:
as the least eigengap of any P θ .
We make the following assumption about Θ. Condition 4.6. We assume that the Markov Chain induced by each P θ ∈ Θ is irreducible and aperiodic. This implies that each P θ has a unique stationary distribution π θ .
Additionally, we assume that each P θ is a reversible Markov Chain, π Θ > 0 and that g Θ > 0.
Condition 4.6 is quite reasonable; if P θ does not have a stationary distribution, then the influence of the initial state may not decay over time, and we may need to add O(T ) noise for privacy. The second part ensures that the decay in the influence of the initial state is fast enough, and may be relaxed somewhat.
Provided Condition 4.6 holds, we can provide upper bounds on the max-influence of a Markov Quilt X Q on a node X i .
Lemma 4.7. Let X i be any node in the Markov Chain, and suppose a and b are integers such that min(a, b) ≥ log(1/πΘ) gΘ
Moreover, if X Q = {X i−a } is a Markov Quilt for X i , then:
and if X Q = {X i+b } is a Markov Quilt for X i , then:
.
and if X Q = ∅ is a trivial Markov Quilt for X i , then e(X Q |X i ) = 0.
As a consequence of Lemmas 4.5 and 4.7, we can assign S Q,i , the set of Markov Quilts for node X i , to:
When g Θ and π Θ are known, (an upper bound on) the score of each X Q may be calculated quite easily in O(1) time based on Lemma 4.7. Thus, the computational complexity of the Markov Quilt mechanism in this case is O(T 3 ). A more optimized version which runs in O(T 2 ) time in some good cases is derived in Appendix B.2.
Generalization to Vector-valued Functions. The Markov Quilt Mechanism can be easily generalized to vector-valued functions F . If F is 1-Lipschitz with respect to L 1 norm, then from Proposition 1 of (Dwork et al., 2006) , adding noise drawn from σ max · Lap(1) to each output dimension of F guarantees -Pufferfish privacy, where σ max is the quantity in the Markov Quilt Mechanism.
Simulations
We now illustrate the performance of the Markov Quilt Mechanism through simulations. We consider the setting in Section 4.3 where the underlying Bayesian network is an aperiodic, irreducible and reversible discrete time Markov chain with k states. The function F we use is the histogram of states over time t = 1, . . . , T . The output of F is a k-dimensional vector (f 1 , . . . , f k ) where f i is the frequency of state i in times 1 to T , and the desired output is noisy frequencies (f 1 , . . . , f k ). This histogram function is 2/T -Lipschitz with respect to the L 1 norm, and thus can be scaled to fit our mechanism.
Synthetic data is generated as follows. Firstly, we choose two generating parameters π gen ∈ (0, 1/k), g gen ∈ (0, 1) and generate an aperiodic, irreducible and reversible transition matrix P such that π min (P ) ≥ π gen and g(P ) ≥ g gen . Then we generate a random vector q ∈ R k uniformly from the probability simplex as the initial distribution. A se-
is then generated from the Markov Chain induced by P and q as our dataset.
Notice that the transition matrix P or the generating parameters π gen , g gen are not known to the private mechanism; the mechanism only knows conservative estimates of π gen and g gen , denoted by π est and g est . We enforce that π est ≤ π gen and g est ≤ g gen . Therefore, π est , g est together with can be viewed as a set of "privacy parameters". As gets smaller, the mechanism guarantees more privacy; as π est or g est gets smaller, the mechanism is able to guarantee protection against a larger set of distributions.
Utility of the mechanism is measured by the L 1 distance between the output (f 1 , . . . , f k ) with (f 1 , . . . , f k ), the exact frequencies. A smaller distance implies higher utility. In our simulations, we investigate the effect on utility of the three privacy parameters, as well as T , the total length of the sequence. In each simulation, we keep two of the parameters {π est , g est , T } fixed, and vary the remaining one and . We plot L 1 distance on the y-axis as a function of log . P, q are generated with k = 5 and generating parameters π gen = 0.05, g gen = 0.1, and are fixed throughout the simulations. We repeat each simulation 100 times and plot the averaged error in the figures. A new dataset
is generated at each repeated run. Figure 2 shows the results. We observe that as expected, when the remaining parameters are fixed, utility improves with larger as well as larger π est and larger g est . An interesting observation is that π est is less influential to utility than g est ; this agrees with the dependence of max-influence on π est in Lemma A.2. Finally, Figure 2c shows that as the total sequence length T gets larger, our Markov Quilt Mechanism outputs more accurate results.
Related Work
There is a great deal of work on differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006) and differentially private mechanisms, especially for machine learning. For more details, see (Sarwate and Chaudhuri, 2013; Dwork and Roth, 2013) .
Our work uses Pufferfish, a recent generalization of differential privacy introduced by (Kifer and Machanavajjhala, 2014) . (Kifer and Machanavajjhala, 2014 ) provides a number of elegant examples of Pufferfish with associated privacy mechanisms. (He et al., 2014) provides practical and efficient privacy algorithms for specific Pufferfish frameworks. However, none of these works provide a fully general Pufferfish mechanism, nor do they provide algorithms for time series and social network applications. (Kessler et al., 2015) apply Pufferfish to smart-meter data; instead of directly modeling correlation through Markov models, they add noise to the wavelet coefficients of the time series that correspond to different frequencies. Finally, (Yang et al., 2015) consider privacy issues in correlated data with privacy definition that is similar to Pufferfish; unlike us, they look at correlation that can be modeled by a Gaussian Markov Random Field, and their privacy definition accounts for the adversary's prior knowledge more explicitly.
Finally, coupled-worlds privacy (Bassily et al., 2013 ) is an elegant privacy framework alternative to Pufferfish, which is also capable of accounting for correlation in data. How to model complex kinds of correlated data in this framework, and how to design privacy mechanisms for these models is left as an avenue for future work. A. Proofs
A.1. Proof to Theorem 3.2 (Privacy of the Wasserstein Mechanism)
Proof. Let (s i , s j ) be a pair of secrets in Q and let θ ∈ Θ such that p(s i |θ) > 0 and p(s j |θ) > 0. Recall that µ i,θ = p(F (X) = ·|s i , θ), and µ j,θ is defined similarly. Let γ * = γ * (µ i,θ , µ j,θ ) be the coupling between µ i,θ and µ j,θ that achieves the ∞-Wasserstein distance.
Using M to denote the Wasserstein mechanism, we can write for any w,
Here the first step follows from the definition of the Wasserstein mechanism, the second step from properties of the Laplace distribution, and the third step from the following property of ∞-Wasserstein distance:
Observe that in the last step of (5) Similar argument can be used to show that
Combining these two facts concludes the proof of the theorem.
A.2. Proof to Theorem 4.4 (Privacy of the Markov Quilt Mechanism)
Proof. Pick a specific secret pair (s i a , s i b ) ∈ Q and a fixed θ ∈ Θ. Let X Q be the Markov Quilt for X i which has the minimum score σ(X Q ), and suppose that deleting X Q breaks up the underlying Bayesian network into X N and X R where
For any w we have
Privacy of Correlated Data
Recall that for any value x R∪Q of X R∪Q ,
Since X Q is a Markov Quilt for X i and
Therefore, the right hand side of (6) is at most:
Since F is 1-Lipschitz, for any fixed value of X R∪Q , F (X) can vary by at most card(X N ) (potentially when all the variables in X N change values). Since σ max ≥ card(X N )
−e(X Q |Xi) and Z ∼ Lap(1), for any x R∪Q , we have:
Combining this with (7), for any w and any secret pair (s
which completes the proof of the theorem.
A.3. Proof of Lemma 4.5
Proof. It is easy to check that X R , X Q , X N partitions the node set X, thus meets the first criterion of 4.3.
It remains to check that X R is conditional independent of X i given X Q . This can be verified by the d-separation criteria. If the any path from X i to nodes in X R is d-separated by X Q , then the conditional independence claim will hold. In a discrete Markov chain, there exists only one path between X i and any node X j ∈ X R . Since the path connects the nodes in ascending index order, there must be a node in X Q that blocks the path. Hence X i is conditionally independent of set X R given X Q . The second criterion of 4.3 is met.
Therefore, the choice of X Q in Lemma 4.5 is indeed an Markov Quilt.
A.4. Proof of Lemma 4.7
The main ingredient in the proof of Lemma 4.7 is the following (fairly standard) result in Markov Chain theory:
Lemma A.1. Consider a k-state discrete time Markov Chain with a transition matrix P with eigengap g * . Let π be the stationary distribution of the chain and let π min = min x π(x) be the minimum probability of any state in the stationary distribution. If P t is the t-th power of P such that P t (x, y) = Pr(X i+t = y|X i = x), then,
Or equivalently,
This lemma, along with some algebra, suffices to show the following two facts:
, and ∆ t = exp(−tgΘ) πΘ . Then, for any j, any θ ∈ Θ, and any x, x and y,
. Then, for any j > 0, any θ ∈ Θ, and any x, x and y,
Proof. (of Lemma 4.7) First, we can express e(X Q |X i ) as
For any x, x and any x Q , by conditional independence,
Taking log on both sides, we have
For any θ ∈ Θ, let P be the corresponding transition matrix, and π, g * be the stationary distribution and eigengap of P .
. Then by Lemma A.2 and Lemma A.3, we have
Combining the two inequalities together, when X Q = {X i−a , X i+b }, we have
Moreover, when X Q = {X i−a }, the
Pr(X i+b =x i+b |Xi=x ,θ) term will degenerate to 1, thus
Similarly, when X Q = {X i+b }, the
Pr(Xi−a=xi−a|Xi=x ,θ) term will degenerate to 1, thus
Since the above results hold for any x, x , x Q and θ, we can conclude the three statements of Lemma 4.7.
Privacy of Correlated Data A.5. Proof to Lemma A.1
The full standard proof can be found at (Levin et al., 2009 ).
Proof. Let P be the transition matrix. Construct a matrix A s.t. A(x, y) = π(x) 1/2 π(y) −1/2 P (x, y). A is symmetric since the chain is reversible, therefore A can be written as
Define another inner product
We call a matrix π-orthonormal if its basis are orthonormal with respect to ·, · π .
by the construction of A and A = V ΛV T , we have
/2 V and let u i , v i represent the i-th column vector of U and V respectively, we observe
Thus P is π-orthonormal with {u i } as its basis.
u i , u j π = 1 when i = j and u i , u j π = 0 otherwise.
Then express P t in terms of U ,
Since the chain is aperiodic and irreducible, P has a unique largest eigenvalue λ 1 = 1, we can rewrite the expression above as , where λ * is the eigenvalue of P whose absolute value is the second largest. Furthermore,
We eventually get , where g = 1 − λ * denotes the eigengap of P .
A.6. Proof to Lemma A.2
Proof. Consider any underlying distribution θ ∈ Θ with transition matrix P , and let the stationary distribution be π and the eigengap of P be g * . We have Pr(X t+j = y|X j = x) Pr(X t+j = y|X j = x ) = P t (x, y) P t (x , y) = P t (x, y)/π(y) P t (x , y)/π(y) .
Based on Lemma A.1, for ∆ Recall that 0 ≤ ∆ θ t ≤ ∆ t ≤ 1, where ∆ t is as defined in Lemma A.2. Therefore 1 − ∆ t ≤ P t (x, y)/π(y) ≤ 1 + ∆ t and the lemma follows.
A.7. Proof to Lemma A.3
Proof. Consider any underlying distribution θ ∈ Θ with transition matrix P , and let the stationary distribution be π and the eigengap of P be g * . By Bayes' rule we have Pr(X j = y|X t+j = x) Pr(X j = y|X t+j = x ) = Pr(X t+j = x|X j = y) Pr(X j = y)/ Pr(X t+j = x) Pr(X t+j = x |X j = y) Pr(X j = y)/ Pr(X t+j = x ) = P t (y, x) Pr(X t+j = x ) P t (y, x ) Pr(X t+j = x) .
Let ∆ We also have P (X t+j = x) = y P (X t+j = x|X j = y)P (X j = y) ≤ max y P (X t+j = x|X j = y) = max P t (y, x)
and similarly, P (X t+j = x) = y P (X t+j = x|X j = y)P (X j = y)
≥ min y P (X t+j = x|X j = y) = min The lemma follows from the fact that 0 ≤ ∆ θ t ≤ ∆ t ≤ 1, where ∆ t is as defined in Lemma A.2.
B. Implementing the Markov Quilt Mechanism for Markov Chains
In this section, we provide a detailed description of the Markov Quilt Mechanism for Markov chain, along with a more computationally efficient version of the algorithm. Throughout this section we assume that the Pufferfish parameters (S, Q, Θ) and the corresponding g Θ , π Θ are known.
B.1. The Markov Quilt Mechanism for Markov Chains
Algorithm 1 presents the Markov Quilt mechanism for a Markov Chain. Recall that in this case, the set S Q,i of plausible Markov Quilts for node X i that we search over is of the form:
S Q,i = {X i−a , X i+b }, {X i−a }, {X i+b }, ∅, ∀a ∈ log(1/π Θ ) g Θ , . . . , i − 1 , b ∈ log(1/π Θ ) g Θ , . . . , T − i .
Algorithm 1 enumerates over all Markov Quilts in S Q,i for all nodes X i in the chain, computes the requisite scores, and calculates σ max , which is (approximately) the minimum standard deviation of the amount of noise needed to keep the values of all nodes private. Finally, it adds Laplace noise with standard deviation proportional to σ max to the exact value of F (D) to ensure privacy.
Algorithm 1 BasicMarkovQuiltMechansim( , F , D)
Initialize σ max ← 0 for X i ∈ X do σ i ← FindBestMarkovQuilt(i, ) σ max = max(σ max , σ i ) end for return F (D) + σ max · Lap (1) Algorithm 2 shows the FindBestMarkovQuilt function that returns the minimal score of any Markov Quilt in S Q,i . This is computed by searching over the set S Q,i of candidate Markov quilts for X i .
